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BOOK REVIEW
CONCEPTUALISING PROPERTY LAW: INTEGRATING COMMON LAW
AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS, by Yaëll Emerich, Elgar, 2018, ISBN
978-1-78811-183-6, 352 pp, £22/$31.
In her newly published book, Conceptualising Property Law:
Integrating Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, Yaëll Emerich
explores the evolution and current status of property law in the civil
and common law.1 The predominant theme that emerges from this
impressively learned, eight chapter study is one of convergence.
Emerich repeatedly reveals that property—both as a general legal
concept and as a set of institutional arrangements governing how
people use, manage and exchange both tangible and intangible resources—actually functions in remarkably similar ways in the civil
law and common law traditions despite different historical origins
and doctrinal labels. Emerich’s interest in—and discovery of—this
striking commonality originates in her commitment to “transsystemia,” an approach to teaching and understanding law that grew
out of Quebec’s fertile bilingual, bijural mixed jurisdiction.
Many diverse readers will benefit from Emerich’s work. Lawyers, judges and traditional doctrinal property law scholars in the
largest civil law and common law systems will learn much from
Emerich’s careful study simply because of its clear, incisive description of so much law. Readers in other mixed jurisdictions, such as
Louisiana, Scotland and South Africa, will find the portions of
Emerich’s book that detail the choices Quebec has made in creating
its property law system particularly intriguing. Property theorists
will also find Emerich’s book rewarding as it points to a number of
deep, cross-jurisdictional patterns in the structure of property law.
1. YAËLL EMERICH, CONCEPTUALISING PROPERTY LAW: INTEGRATING
COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS 1 (Edward Elgar Publ’g 2018). As
Emerich notes, the 2018 publication is in part a translation of her 2017 book, Droit
commun des biens : perspective transsystémique (Éditions Yvon Blais 2017), but
also contains some substantive changes. Id. at vi.
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Emerich’s method of analysis might be described as an advanced form of functional comparative law. In the six chapters that
focus on specific doctrinal categories and questions, Emerich carefully analyzes each subject, combining recent theoretical insights
with objective, fair-minded descriptions of the relevant law in Quebec, the rest of Canada, England, and France. She relies on a mixture
of sources including scholarly monographs, treatises, textbooks, and
law review articles. She frequently dives into the Quebec and French
Civil Codes and common law statutes such as the Law of Property
Act of 1925 (England and Wales). On occasion, she also discusses
judicial decisions in some detail, with particular attention given to
decisions from Quebec, the Canadian common law provinces, and
the Supreme Court of Canada, along with occasional mention of
English, Australian, American, Scottish and French decisions.
The major reward produced by Emerich’s methodical analysis is
the picture of property’s structural unity in the diverse legal systems
she studies when viewed at a broad enough scale. Sometimes this
structural unity or convergence is explained by cross-system pollination. Other times it appears to result from deeper forces and needs
in modern, market-oriented societies governed by the rule of law
where legal elites (those who make property law) seek to afford individuals and legal entities a large measure of contractual freedom
to arrange their affairs regarding tangible and intangible resources.
Emerich’s book is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1, the introduction, focuses almost entirely on the intellectual history and
aims of “transsystemia,” which she defines as “a legal approach centred on a dialogue between legal traditions, anchored in a pluralist
and non-hierarchical method that celebrates the irreducible differences and similarities between various traditions.”2 Emerich’s introductory chapter nicely explains how transsystemia began as a
pedagogical experiment at McGill Law School and transitioned into
a full-blown “knowledge project” with complex epistemological
2. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 1.
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aims.3 In Emerich’s telling, transsystemia is an approach to understanding law that seeks to move beyond borders, transcend legal
positivism, and reveal underlying conceptual and social commonalities and differences, while embracing dialogue and “dynamic pluralism.”4 A good portion of the introduction explores the subtle distinctions between traditional comparative law as both a method and
a science and transsystemic analysis, whose goals embrace “crosspollination” of legal discourse, decentering legal positivism and deconstructing law itself.5 Unlike traditional comparative law, transsystemia, as Emerich describes it, is less interested in harmonization
or unification of the law and more interested in dialogue and “impregnation of one tradition in another.”6 Emerich’s introductory
chapter closes with a fascinating discussion of a 1921 decision of
the Privy Council,7 in which common law courts applying Canadian
law began their long, and not always successful, attempt to incorporate aboriginal title into Canada’s property system. Emerich thus
opens another theme that weaves throughout her study, the story of
how non-western legal traditions confront western traditions, while
often remaining shadowed by precariousness.
The second chapter of Emerich’s book, “Historical approach to
property,” actually consists of three stories, all concerning the basic
idea of ownership or title. The first story concerns the development
of the Romanist conception of ownership as power over both corporeal and incorporeal things, the challenge posed to this conception
by continental feudalism and the recovery of a more unified, absolutist conception of ownership with the French Revolution, and the
eventual codification of French law under the Code Napoléon. As
she tells this well-known story, Emerich also weaves in the complex
3. Id. at 3.
4. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 5.
5. Id. at 5–8.
6. Id. at 9.
7. Matamajaw Salmond Club v. Duchaine, [1921] 2 A.C. 426. At the end of
Chapter 1, Emerich admits that “recognition of Aboriginal law remains precarious
in Canada.” EMERICH, supra note 1, at 14.
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story of the development of English common law’s more fragmented conception of multiple estates in land growing out of English feudalism. She explains how this fragmented, relational system
gradually evolved, with assistance from statutory reform and enlightenment philosophy, into a relatively unitary conception of ownership as a subjective right conferring exclusive authority over
things, including, when it comes to land, the exclusive authority expressed as the “fee simple” estate.
Many readers will find Emerich’s detailed account of the work
of the glossators in the 12th and 13th centuries and the post-glossators in the 14th century (namely Bartolus and the French jurist Jean
Faure) particularly enlightening as this period of civil law development is often shrouded in mystery.8 Equally enlightening will be
Emerich’s rich account of Quebec’s reception of a feudal property
system in the 17th century, with both French and English feudal elements.9 Readers will likely find Emerich’s bijural account of the
development of the idea of ownership as a subjective right compelling as she links jurists as diverse as Ockham, Grotius, Pothier and
Blackstone.10 Emerich closes this historical chapter by returning
once more to the problem of how Canadian courts have struggled to
accommodate the property claims of its indigenous peoples, the First
Nations. According to Emerich, while important conceptual progress has been made by Canadian courts and jurists, there “is still
little recognition of actual Aboriginal titles.”11
In her third chapter, “Origins of title: possession and its effects,”
Emerich turns to a classic subject of comparative legal analysis. In
this highly detailed account, which largely focuses on English and
Canadian common law and French and Quebec civil law notions of
possession and the respective systems’ treatment of the effects of
possession, Emerich finds many convergences and similarities.
8.
9.
10.
11.

EMERICH, supra note 1, at 25–29.
Id. at 29–31.
Id. at 39–41.
Id. at 45.
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Borrowing from the American property law scholar Carol Rose and
the French scholar Raymond Saleilles,12 however, Emerich also explores the theme of possession as a form of communication.
The first part of this chapter reviews the classic elements of the
concept of possession in the civil law (animus and corpus) and common law (animus domini and corpus or factum).13 This part also explains the subtle distinctions between animus domini (the intent to
possess as owner), animus possidendi (the intent to possess) and animus excludendi (the intent to exclude third parties) and the subtle
theoretical differences between Savigny’s subjective theory of possession, in which the intent to exercise the right of ownership is decisive, and Ihering’s objective theory of possession, in which the
possessor’s carrying out of acts that a typical owner would carry out
is crucial.14 Although Emerich recognizes the conventional wisdom
that Savigny’s views prevailed in the civil law jurisdictions of
France and Quebec and that Ihering’s views prevailed in common
law jurisdictions such as England and in some civil law jurisdictions
(Germany), she again finds evidence of convergence between the
two dominant western views of possession.15
The second major part of this chapter addresses the important
distinction between possession as a legal fact and ownership as a
more abstract right or relationship. It is here that Emerich draws
most explicitly on Rose and Saleilles (and to a lesser extent on
Holmes and Salmond) to demonstrate that in both the civil law and
common law traditions, possession ultimately functions as a form of
communication—a way of making claims to third parties about who
is master of a thing,16 or as Emerich puts it finally, “communication
to others of one’s intention to exercise control over property.”17
12. See generally Carol M. Rose, Possession As the Origin of Property, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985); RAYMOND SALEILLES, ÉTUDE SUR LES ÉLÉMENTS CONSTITUTIFS DE LA POSSESSION (Imprimerie de Darantière 1894).
13. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 50–53.
14. Id. at 51–53.
15. Id. at 54–56.
16. Id. at 57–61.
17. Id. at 64 (emphasis in original).
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The remainder of Chapter 3 explores many other nuances of possession and the many practical effects (or as Jean Carbonnier would
say “blessings”) of possession.18 These topics include: (1) how possession combined with the passage of time leads to the acquisition
of ownership through acquisitive prescription and adverse possession; (2) possession’s role in the doctrine of relativity of title at common law; (3) the distinction between possession, occupancy and
quasi-occupancy in civil law (especially in Quebec); (4) the modalities of the good faith purchaser doctrine in French and Quebec law;
(5) the importance of good faith in acquisitive prescriptive and adverse possession in different legal systems; (6) the role of possession
in establishing Aboriginal Title in Canadian law; (7) the theoretical
justifications for acquisitive prescription and adverse possession and
the challenge to those justifications posed by the development of
reliable land registration systems in the UK, Australia and Canada;
(8) the tenuous case for protecting possession separately from ownership through distinct and non-cumulative possessory and petitory
actions; and (9) the requirements for possessory protection and its
availability to mere detentors.19 Louisiana readers will be particularly interested in Emerich’s account of how Quebec has rejected
the rule preventing the cumulation of possessory and petitory actions and how France has now eliminated possessory actions entirely from its Civil Code.20
18. Id. at 47 & n.2 (quoting 2 JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL : LES BIENS,
No. 784, at 1720 (Quadrige, Presses Universitaires de France
2004)).
19. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 64–78, 81–85.
20. Id. at 79–80 (discussing Article 722 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure and the law of 16 February 2015). Louisiana, however, still relies upon the
anti-cumulation principle, despite its occasionally harsh results. See LA. CODE
CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 3657; Hooper v. Hero Lands Co., 216 So. 3d 965, 973 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 2016) (finding improper cumulation of the possessory and petitory
action and thus imposing burden on plaintiff of proving better title than defendant); On Leong Chinese Merchants Ass’n v. AKM Acquisitions, L.L.C., 188 So.
3d 1041 (La. 2016) (recounting long saga involving complex cumulation issues);
Goal Properties, Inc. v. Prestridge, 177 So. 3d 126 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2015) (holding that defendant who asserts title in a possessory action converts the action to a
petitory action).
LES OBLIGATIONS,
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Chapter 4 of Emerich’s study bears the enigmatic title: “In
search of private property: between the civil law and the common
law.” This provocative chapter compares how property law scholars
in both the civil law and common law have theorized the constitutive
elements, incidents or characteristics of property and, more particularly, the notion of ownership. Emerich emphasizes several subthemes in this chapter. First, she points out frequently that even
though the common law system of estates seems to create a more
relational, fragmented notion of private property with the residuary
interest held by the Crown, the modern “fee simple” estate functions
more or less like the modern civil law concept of full, unencumbered
ownership.21
Another sub-theme concerns the bundle of rights conception of
ownership in the common law, most famously articulated by Honoré
as eleven distinct “incidents” of ownership, and the traditional
“Latin triptych” of usus-fructus-abusus in the civil law.22 For
Emerich, the ability of theorists, lawyers and lawgivers to conceptualize ownership in terms of these “incidents” or “attributes” again
reveals the flexibility of the concepts of property and ownership.
Moreover, drawing on both English and American theorists dating
back to Hohfeld, and the French “personnalistes” (notably Planiol
and Ginossar), Emerich argues that the “fragmentability” of property reveals its fundamental relational quality. Her core insight
here—one shared, of course, by many property theorists—is that
property is a set of relationships between people regarding things,
rather than a set of relationships between people and things.23
21. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 90, 112–16. In the second meditation on this
theme in chapter 4, Emerich also explores the durational quality of ownership,
with special attention to the inter-relationship between “imprescriptibility” and
potential “perpetuity” of ownership and other real rights. Id. at 112–16. As a property law professor who often draws students’ attention to these questions, I found
this section particularly enlightening.
22. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 94–97. Here, Emerich relies on the classic essay: A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107–47 (A.
G. Guest ed., Clarendon Press 1961).
23. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 99–100
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In the last subtheme in this chapter, Emerich argues that the fundamental characteristic of property—its “essence” as she puts it—is
that it establishes “a relationship of exclusivity” between owners
and non-owners.24 Here, Emerich uses several leading decisions
from Canada and the United States and the work of English property
theorist James Penner, among others, to argue that although property
is certainly relational, “its uniqueness lies in the creation of an exclusive space relating to things subject to property rights, be they
tangible or intangible.”25 By referring to this “uniqueness,” and describing property “as a relation of exclusivity,” Emerich distinguishes property from other spheres of private law, such as contract
and tort, and seems to position her view of property closer to those
of some leading U.S. theorists who place exclusion at the core of
property.26
The final portion of Chapter 4 provides a more classic comparative law analysis of two problems: original acquisition of ownership of movable things or personal property (wild animals, lost and
abandoned things, even treasure) and derivative acquisition of ownership through voluntary transfer.27 Anyone who delights in property law will find Emerich’s recounting of the relevant Quebec Civil
Code provisions and several curious Quebec cases addressing original acquisition of ownership to be particularly exhilarating.
In her fifth chapter, entitled “Limitations to private property,”
Emerich pivots away from exclusion and focuses primarily on other
24. Id. at 98.
25. Id. at 104.
26. Here Emerich appears to align her claims about the comparative institutional nature of property and the importance of exclusion with American theorists
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith. See generally Henry E. Smith, Property as the
Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001);
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730
(1998). For an insightful evaluation of the theoretical claims of Merrill and Smith
and the reactions to their claims among other American theorists and an argument
that Merrill and Smith’s claims are more capacious and not as formalistic as some
of their critics contend, see Katrina M. Wyman, The New Essentialism in Property, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 183 (2017).
27. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 116–29.
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strategies to regulate property, and in particular on the duties owed
by property owners to other property owners and the role of the state
and collective decision making in curtailing property owners’ sphere
of exclusive authority. Emerich’s primary subjects of analysis here
are the civil law doctrines of “abuse of right” and neighborhood disturbances (“troubles de voisinage”) and the common law doctrine of
nuisance. Once again, despite their distinct and mixed historical origins and often quite divergent procedural and institutional settings,
Emerich ultimately finds more functional similarities than differences. Whether confronted by a potential “neighborhood disturbance” arising under Article 976 of the Quebec Civil Code or a common law “nuisance” case, courts will always struggle to draw the
line between mere inconveniences that a neighbor must tolerate and
real damage that can be remedied by a monetary award or injunctive
relief. Further, Emerich finds that courts will always undertake a
deeply relational inquiry to decide these difficult cases. 28
The second and third parts of Chapter 5 address other limitations
on the exclusive rights of private property owners. Here Emerich
focuses first on how the right of the state and other state sanctioned
entities to acquire ownership of or real rights in private property
without the consent of the owner limits private property in both civil
28. Id. at 137–46. Although Emerich’s explication of the leading English and
Quebec cases in this area is exemplary, EMERICH, supra note 1, at 138, 140, her
inquiry neglects to include consideration of recent developments in Louisiana that
challenge her assertion that neighborhood disputes are always resolved using theories of unreasonable harm rather than fault or negligence. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 667 (amended 1996) (incorporating a three-part fault based analysis into
the determination of whether a proprietor is “answerable for damage” for a work
that “deprives his neighbor of enjoyment or causes damages to him”). Compare
Rizzo v. Nichols, 867 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2004) (applying revised Article
667 to find defendant liable for monetary damages based on fault due to flooding
caused by new construction on defendant’s property), with Taylor v. Haddox, 968
So. 2d 1200, 1203–04 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2007) (distinguishing Rizzo and finding
that owner of mobile home park was not liable for damages under Article 667 for
damages arising from overflow of oxidation ponds because defendant has used
reasonable care to prevent runoff, pollution and silting); Fiebelkorn v. Alford, 105
So. 3d 110, 120 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2012) (affirming trial court finding that plaintiff
failed to prove that defendant’s construction caused water damage on plaintiff’s
property).
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and common law systems. Although she reveals how the historical,
constitutional and legislative background and the techniques and nomenclature of “expropriation” in French and Quebec civil law and
“compulsory purchase” in English and Canadian common law differ,29
she still finds much more cross-system similarity, particularly as both
the power to expropriate and the scope of property subject to forced
transfer in both traditions has tended to expand over time. Emerich also
notes the occasional judicial resistance that surfaces when private property owners face overly aggressive coercive transfers or seek protection
from technically non-appropriating regulations that nevertheless have
the effect of eliminating all economic uses of private property.30
Emerich concludes Chapter 5 with a description of the limits imposed on property by the “collective interest,” by which she means
public or state claims to air rights, subsurface mineral rights and water.
Even though these resources are connected to land and could, in theory,
be the object of private property rights, Emerich details how in all of
the systems she studies these resources are either heavily regulated by
the state, treated as a common resource, or are owned by the state for
the benefit of the public.31 Emerich also describes a fascinating series
of cases from British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Quebec in which Canadian courts were called upon to examine whether environmental regulations restricting property owners’ ability to exploit minerals or the
surface of the land amounted to an expropriation for which compensation must be paid.32 Collectively these cases call to mind the
29. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 147–52.
30. Id. at 152–60. Although one understands Emerich’s likely reluctance to
delve deeply into the U.S. regulatory takings doctrine, one cannot help but wonder
how Emerich’s thesis of growing convergence between civil and common law
conceptions of expropriation would hold up if applied to recent U.S. Supreme
Court decisions. For a recent and authoritative summation of developments in
U.S. regulatory takings doctrine and a critique of the dominant approaches to understanding those developments, see Timothy M. Mulvaney, Property-as-Society,
2018 WIS. L. REV. 911 (2018).
31. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 152–66. Louisiana lawyers will be interested
to learn that in France and Quebec both solid minerals and fossil fuels below the
surface of land are reserved for the state. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 161–62 (discussing Mining Act, CQLR, c. m-131, art. 3 and Fr. Civ. C. art. 552).
32. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 167–68.
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United States Supreme Court’s regulatory takings doctrine yet seem
to indicate that Canadian courts are generally quite reluctant to characterize environmental regulation as an expropriation except in the
most extreme cases.
Chapter 6 of Emerich’s book begins by reviewing the classificatory taxonomies of both civil law and common law property, particularly with respect to “the objects of property rights,” the title of the
chapter. Emerich first instructs that the immovable and movable distinction in civil law roughly, but not perfectly, mirrors the real property and personal property distinction in common law. Similarly, she
notes that the corporeal and incorporeal property distinction in civil
law tracks, in large part, the tangible and intangible property distinction in common law.33 She also points out that in the eyes of most
civil law jurists the broad category of property includes not only the
material objects of property (things), but also immaterial rights in
material objects. Indeed, according to Emerich, most civil law purists prefer to conceptualize property as the universe of patrimonial
rights, rather than things, since “the value of assets stem more so
from rights that one has over a thing than from the thing itself.”34
Despite recent evolution in civilian thought, Emerich still reviews
the conventional wisdom of comparative property law that the civil
law has tended to reduce the objects of property and ownership to
corporeal things (largely because of a mistaken and overly rigid
reading of Roman law), whereas the common law has had a much
easier time viewing incorporeal rights as objects of property because
of (1) the abstract and relational nature of feudalism and its by-product, the estates systems, and (2) the flexibility of concepts such as
choses in possession and choses in action.35 Emerich returns to her
core theme of “convergence,” however, when she celebrates that a
growing number of French and Quebec jurists now recognize that
property can be both corporeal and incorporeal and that Quebec now
33. Id. at 177–83.
34. Id. at 182.
35. Id. at 183–89
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warmly welcomes the “dematerialization of property law” and thus
has caught up to the “dephsyicalisation of property” found in the
common law.36
Emerich concludes chapter 6 by offering her own list of essential criteria for defining the scope of objects of property. For
Emerich, the things and rights (material or immaterial) that can legitimately be understood as objects of property must: (1) have some
value (presumably a pecuniary value); (2) be alienable or transferable to some degree; (3) be capable of appropriation; that is, public
policy must recognize that the thing or right can be appropriated, or,
as James Penner famously theorized,37 that the thing or right is “only
contingently connected to any particular person,” and, therefore,
could belong to someone else; and (4) be enforceable against third
persons (i.e., there must be a way to exclude others from interference
with the thing or right).38 As one would expect given her transsystemic orientation, the sources Emerich identifies in constructing
this list of criteria are attractively pluralistic, ranging from American
property theorists Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, to English theorist James Penner, Quebec property scholar David Lametti, traditional French doctrinal scholars Baudry-Lacantinerie and Chauveau,
and modern French scholars Frédéric Zenati-Castaing and Thiery
Revet.
The penultimate chapter of Emerich’s study addresses “Fragmentation and modifications to property,” by which she means
the variety of “dismemberments of ownership” in the civil law
and their “functional equivalents” in the common law. Here, as in
many of the other chapters, Emerich deploys her transsystemic
method to reveal that, despite their different historical and conceptual origins, a usufruct functions much like a life estate and
36. Id. at 189–94.
37. Here, Emerich relies on Penner’s famous “separability thesis.” See generally J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 111 (Oxford UP 1997); J.E.
Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 803–
07 (1996).
38. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 194–98.
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that empheteuses in Quebec and emphyteutic and building leases in
France function much like leasehold estates in common law jurisdictions.39 Next, Emerich makes the hardly less surprising finding, given
their common Roman law roots, that civil law servitudes and common
law easements also perform the same law work.40 Emerich also argues
that profits à prendre and restrictive covenants have functional equivalents in the civil law jurisdictions she studies (Quebec and France) in the
concepts of personal servitudes and negative real servitudes or non-compete clauses.41 Turning to the question of whether, and to what extent,
the civil law and common law employ a numerus clausus principle—a
restricted menu of recognized property forms that can bind successive
owners even in the absence of privity of contract, Emerich concludes,
like others before her,42 that regardless of whether each system formally
and expressly limits the ability of property owners to create new kinds
of innominate real rights (often fishing and hunting rights over land but
also increasingly rights in intellectual property), courts will, from time to
time, recognize them if the original contracting parties’ intentions are
clear and third party information processing costs are not too excessive.43
39. Id. at 202–11.
40. Id. at 211–14.
41. Id. at 215–16. In future work, Emerich might benefit from considering
developments in the United States, where easements in gross are now widely recognized, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.5(2) (2000) (defining easement in gross); JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY § 5.5.3, at 211–14 (4th
ed., Wolters Kluwer 2014) (discussing distinction between appurtenant easements
and easements in gross under American common law), and Louisiana, where servitudes in restraint of trade are now recognized, see RCC Properties, L.L.C. v.
Wenstar Properties, L.P., 930 So. 2d 1233 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2006); Meadowcrest
Center v. Tenet Health System Hospitals, Inc., 902 So. 2d 512, 515 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 2005) (discussed in John A. Lovett, Title Conditions in Restraint of Trade, in
MIXED JURISDICTIONS COMPARED: PRIVATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND SCOTLAND
30–66 (Vernon Valentine Palmer & Elspeth Christie Reid eds., Edinburgh UP
2009), and where all affirmative predial servitudes, whether formerly characterized as continuous or discontinuous, can now be acquired by acquisitive prescription. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 742.
42. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1
(2000).
43. EMERICH, supra note 1, at 216–23.
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Emerich concludes Chapter 7 with a walk through the realm of
undivided co-ownership (tenancy in common and its civil law twin
ownership in indivision plus common law joint tenancy and the civil
law equivalent, the “tontine” or “accretion clause”), divided coownership (also known as condominium or commonhold in Canada
and England respectively) and superficies (i.e., “vertical division”
that separates the ownership of buildings and other constructions
from ownership of the land on which they are situated).44 Despite
some technical differences here and there, one is struck by the overwhelming cross-jurisdictional similarity of the legal structures currently used to regulate the complex, interrelating needs of persons
who must cooperate in the management of overlapping property interests that run concurrently, who must share in the management and
upkeep of all or portions of common resources, or who want to divide up interests in complex horizontal or vertical arrangements.
Emerich’s depiction suggests that some invisible magnet of property
ordering in modern, market-oriented societies impels legal systems
toward similar structural arrangements regardless of their different
historical roots.
Emerich’s final chapter addressing “Trusts and fiducia” may be
the most impressive in the entire book as here Emerich takes on one
of the most complex conceptual challenges in the law of property.
In this chapter, Emerich notes how difficult it has been for scholars
to conceptualize the rights, powers and duties of the various actors
in a trust relationship and how challenging it has been for scholars
to trace the institution’s evolution in various legal systems, particularly those like Quebec and France, where the trust does not have
native roots.45 Nevertheless, throughout this chapter Emerich convincingly conveys the practical advantages of trusts (or trust-like arrangements) in modern society and works through both the classic
definitions, re-definitions and re-conceptualizations of the Roman
44. Id. at 223–34.
45. Id. at 238–56.
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trust, the common law trust, the fideicommisum in Quebec, the new
Quebec trust, and the fiducia that has emerged in the French Civil
Code.46 Her eventual “transsystemic” definition of the trust as a
“mechanism [or legal relationship] whereby a person holds or possesses property and administers it for the benefit of another person
or for some specific purpose,”47 nicely captures the core conceptual
insights she unearths in her comparative journey. Many readers will
find her discussion of the recent codification of the fiducia in France
especially enlightening. Property theorists from other jurisdictions,
particularly in North America, will find her final summation of trustee ownership in Scots law, with its useful and quite comprehensible
notion of “dual patrimonies,” compelling.48
Of course, in any book aiming to offer a compressive account
of a broad field from a comparative perspective, some perspectives and some detail must be left out. In this case, some property
scholars will no doubt note that there are important exceptions to
Emerich’s meta-narrative of structural convergence and to her
meta-definition of property as a body or rules that establish relationships of exclusion between owners and non-owners. Observers of property law in Scotland, for instance, would draw attention to the remarkable innovation of the Land Reform (Scotland)
Act of 2003 which give everyone in Scotland a right of responsible access, for purposes of non-motorized recreational access and
travel, to all land in Scotland and thus redefines landownership in
a way that makes tangible exclusion somewhat less of a core
value.49 Students of property law in South Africa would likewise
point out how that country’s new constitution requires property
to serve the ends of social transformation, equality and dignity
just as strongly as property owners’ interest in the exclusive right

46. Id. at 238–56.
47. Id. at 256.
48. Id. at 267–69.
49. See generally John A. Lovett, Progressive Property in Action: The Land
Reform (Scotland) Act of 2003, 89 NEB. L. REV. 739 (2011).

394

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 12

to determine the use of things.50 Lawyers in Louisiana might note
that public access to natural resources like water and water bottoms
is far from settled, given the fierce battle over the contested resource
of recently submerged land resulting from subsidence and coastal
erosion.51
At the more theoretical level, it would also be interesting to see
how Emerich responds to other major developments in contemporary property theory. Although she successfully integrates Carol
Rose’s insights on possession in chapter 3 and Merrill and Smith’s
insights about exclusion and the numerus clausus principle in chapters 3 and 6, Emerich does not engage with the powerful explanatory paradigm of property as both commodity and propriety offered
by Rose and by Greg Alexander.52 Nor does she fully grapple with
the challenge to Merrill and Smith’s theories offered by the followers of the Progressive Property School in the United States and
South Africa who contend that property ownership entails as many
responsibilities and social obligations to non-owners and the community at large as it does rights of exclusion and authority.53 Finally,
Emerich has not responded to insights of scholars like Katrina Wyman who argue that the differences between information processing,
exclusion oriented theorists like Merrill and Smith and their
50. See generally A.J. VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY IN THE MARGINS (Hart
2009); A.J. van der Walt, The Modest Systemic Status of Property Rights, 1. J. L.
PROP. & SOC’Y 15 (2014).
51. See generally Jacques Mestayer, Saving Sportsman’s Paradise: Article
450 and Declaring Ownership of Submerged Lands in Louisiana, 76 LA. L. REV.
889 (2016).
52. See generally Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings
Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984); Carol M. Rose, Property
as Wealth, Property as Propriety, in NOMOS XXXIII 223 (John W. Chapman ed.,
NYU Press 1991); GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970 (U. of
Chicago Press 1997). In a recent article, Frankie McCarthy skillfully uses this
paradigm to explore the constitutional property case law of the European Court of
Human Rights. See Frankie McCarthy, Protection of Property and the European
Convention of Human Rights, 6 WM. & MARY PROP. RIGHTS CONF. J. 1 (2017).
53. For a detailed account, see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, PROPERTY AND HUMAN FLOURISHING (Oxford UP 2018). For a short synopsis, see Lovett, supra note
49, at 743-753. See also the work of VAN DER WALT, supra note 50.
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progressive property critics might not be as wide as either camp
claims because the exclusion theorists are at heart functionalists who
embrace utilitarian cost-benefit analysis when it comes to establishing the boundaries between exclusion and governance strategies in
property law.54
Finally, it should be noted that Emerich’s audience and the real
subject matter of her analysis are legal elites—judges, legislators
perhaps, property lawyers, and, above all, property scholars. As her
title makes clear, she is interested in how judges and jurists have
viewed and conceptualized property. She does not claim to explore
how property law affects ordinary people as lived experience.55
Thus she does not examine how the particularities of place, time,
social custom and individual context affect how property is actually
experienced by those subject to property law. Her approach then is
essentially a top down, not a bottom up, one. Although this is certainly a defensible choice, some consequences follow. After all, if a
property observer moves to a high enough level of abstraction, the
structures and forms of property law may inevitably appear to converge from a functional perspective.56 A truly bottom up approach
might well reveal more divergence than the picture Emerich produces here. But taking a bottom up approach to property would require a completely different kind of book than the compelling and
scholarly one Emerich has written. It would, no doubt, also fail to
detect the many points of convergence and transsystemic cross-pollination that Emerich has discovered and revealed.
John A. Lovett
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law

54. See generally Wyman, supra note 26.
55. For a stunning example of this kind of property analysis, see DEBBIE
BECHER, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND PUBLIC POWER: EMINENT DOMAIN IN PHILADELPHIA (Oxford UP 2014).
56. I am indebted to Jill Robbie, Lecturer at the University of Glasgow Law
School, for this insight.

